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In recent years there is a growing interest in creating a multilateral regional security institution
in East Asia. An absence of such an institution has been identiﬁed as one source of instability for the
region. There is active debate within the policy community for a need to build a regional security
framework but there is little agreement on what form it should take.
This paper addresses the prospects for regional security cooperation and assesses the ﬁve models
of regional security architecture. The paper ﬁnds that each of the models has its merits and demerits,
but the U.S. alliance model and the ASEAN based model are the most promising in realizing
cooperation. The former can provide capabilities to punish while the latter can decrease skepticism
among members. The key to bringing about regional cooperation is to build a network of di#erent
institutions that can be functionally integrated. It is important for the United States and its allies to
understand the insecurity of rising powers like China and bind themselves to a set of mutually
agreeable rules. It is also important to alleviate the anxieties of status quo powers, which in turn will
reassure potential revisionist powers.
I. The Question
There is no multilateral regional security framework in East Asia. It has been
argued that the absence of such an institution hinders stability and integration in this
region, as multilateral security institutions have been known to spur cooperation
among member states. This has led to policy debates about the need to build a regional
security framework. Although most agree that such an institution is necessary, there is
disagreement about what form it should take. This paper addresses the prospects for
regional security cooperation and asks which architecture would be the most e#ective
in bringing about regional security cooperation.
This question is important for several reasons. First, it tests the mechanism behind
cooperation. Among di#erent types of cooperation, security cooperation is the hardest
to achieve because security, by deﬁnition, is about defending the core values of a state,
so compromise is more di$cult than in other ﬁelds such as trade. Thinking about
security cooperation helps us understand the mechanism behind cooperation because it
is a hard case. Second, looking at this question will help provide an answer to a heated
discussion among foreign and security policy specialists in the region.
I argue that while the prospects for security cooperation are not exactly bright, it is
possible. Each of the regional security models has its merits and demerits. The key to
bringing about regional cooperation is to build a network of di#erent institutions that
 This paper is based on earlier research conducted for the Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI).
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can be functionally integrated. It is also important to alleviate the anxieties of status
quo powers, which in turn will reassure potential revisionist powers.
I will ﬁrst review the theoretical framework I use in this paper: the theory of
cooperation by Axelrod.1 I will then review the ﬁve models for regional security
cooperation that are discussed among policy makers. Next, I will introduce a snapshot
of where we are today. I will then ask which model has the best chances of encouraging
cooperation according to Axelrod’s model. Next, I will analyze the beneﬁts and
shortcomings of each of the models and o#er ways to improve them. Finally, I will
conclude by o#ering some suggestions for policy makers.
II. Conditions for Cooperation
1. Theories of Cooperation
Di#erent schools of international relations o#er di#erent mechanisms for coopera-
tion among states. In this section, I will review mechanisms for cooperation o#ered by
realism, liberalism, and scholars such as Axelrod.
Realism contends that cooperation occurs when a stronger actor pressures a weaker
one to concede. Multilateral security cooperation is achieved when a hegemonic power
drives other states to form an institution. In other words, the presence of a hegemon
or at least a strong leader is required for multilateral institutions to emerge. This is
because of a collective action problem, where each state may see beneﬁts of cooperation
but is unwilling to bear the initial start up costs.2 There is no incentive for an individual
state to provide public goods and let others free ride unless that state has the power and
interest to do so unilaterally. A hegemon, being the strongest state in the international
system, has the power to shape the institution and thus has the most to gain from it.3
Liberalism, on the other hand, contends that states participate in multilateral
institutions to lower transaction costs.4 Once created, institutions create embedded
interests and states conform to the rules and norms of the institution. The presence of
a hegemon may not be necessary to create an institution. Institutions can be maintained
without a hegemon and they have the power to restrain a hegemon’s behavior.
Axelrod’s theory of cooperation combines elements of both realism and liberalism.
Axelrod argues that cooperation is possible under certain conditions even among
egoists and without a higher central authority. This occurs because states are interest
maximizers, and they will choose to cooperate when doing so furthers their interests. In
Axelrod’s theory, reciprocity and tit-for-tat strategy are important.5 Tit-for-tat is a
strategy in the prisoners’ dilemma. Using this strategy, the ﬁrst player always begins
the ﬁrst move by cooperation. From the second move onwards, Player A reciprocates
1 Robert Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation (Cambridge. MA: Basic Books, 2006)
2 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1971)
3 For arguments about the role of a hegemon in shaping cooperation, see, Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression,
19291939 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986); Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International
Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987)
4 See for example, Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1984)
5 Axelrod’s model is deduced from an observation of historical events and from analyzing a computer game tournament.
In a computer game tournament, the winning strategy in both cases was tit-for-tat. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation.
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the other player’s previous move. If Player A begins with a cooperative move and
Player B defects, Awill also defect in the next move. Player A will continue to defect as
long as B defects, but if B switches to cooperation, A will then also cooperate. The
tit-for-tat strategy was the winning strategy in two cases of computer game tourna-
ments Axelrod organized as part of his research.
The key to cooperation is reciprocity. Cooperative actions are rewarded with
cooperative action and defection is punished promptly. The player is welcomed back to
the game once its behavior becomes cooperative. It is the positive and negative
incentives that lead states to choose cooperation rather than defection.
Here is a summary of the characteristics that facilitate cooperation: a) do not be
envious avoid thinking in zero-sum game terms; b) be nice unilaterally initiate
cooperative actions; c) maintain reciprocity; d) be forgiving once punishment is
completed, permit reentry into the game and initiate cooperation; and e) make clear
moves that other players can follow.
For cooperative behavior to evolve and spread in a system, Axelrod argues that
there must be more than a few states who act in accordance with the above conditions
for cooperation. Otherwise, they will not be able to reciprocate cooperative behavior
and will only choose defection.
2. Ideal Type for Cooperation
Based on the ﬁndings from Axelrod’s study, an institution that facilitates coopera-
tion ideally needs to have the following traits. First, the institution must have a core
group of states that behave and reciprocate cooperatively. Second, there has to be a
su$cient payo# structure for member states to invest in monitoring and punishment. It
is crucially important for defectors to be punished promptly and properly. If defectors
go unpunished, the institution will lose credibility and incentives for others to cooperate
will decrease. This means that the institution must have a monitoring system and the
willingness and capability to punish defectors. Third, future payo#s should be greater
than present payo#s, as this should lead states to cooperate now in order to reap greater
beneﬁts in the future.
III. Five Models of Regional Cooperation
Five models of regional security architecture have been discussed so far. They are:
1) a network of U.S. bilateral alliances; 2) a league of democracies; 3) the Six-Party Talks;
4) an ASEAN based model such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); and 5) the
disaster relief model.
1. U.S. Bilateral Networks
The security of East Asia has long been characterized by a hub-and-spokes system
of U.S. bilateral alliances. The United States has security alliances with Japan, South
Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand.6 Until recently, each alliance stood by
itself and, unlike in Europe, there was little security coordination among alliances.
6 The United States has bilateral security alliances with Japan and South Korea: U.S.Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security, and U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. With Australia it was the Australia, New Zealand, United States
Security Treaty (ANZUS) which included New Zealand. The U.S. commitment to New Zealand ceased in 1986 when New
Zealand adopted a non-nuclear policy. The United States has a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines and from
1999 has the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Thailand was designated a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2003.
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Recently, however, the U.S. bilateral alliances have begun to show potential as the
basis for regional multilateral security cooperation. The United States and its allies
have begun to invite other countries to participate and observe in military exercises
that used to be bilateral. For example, Cobra Gold, which used to be a U.S.-Thai bilateral
military exercise, has turned into a multilateral exercise with six countries participating
as full members and about twenty countries as observers. In the 2010 exercise, South
Korea participated for the ﬁrst time, and Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Japan also
participated. In the past, Australia, Brunei, China, Malaysia, Mongolia, India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Canada and France also have participated as observers.7
There have also been e#orts to connect the spokes. For example, Japan and
Australia issued a JapanAustralia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March
2007.8 The two countries subsequently have held 22 meetings of defense and foreign
ministers and have held trilateral defense meetings with the United States. Ties
between Japan and South Korea also are developing. The U.S., Korean and Japanese
defense ministers held their ﬁrst trilateral meeting in May 2009 in Singapore. Japan has
shown more enthusiasm for developing this relationship than has South Korea,9 but the
heightened tension in the Korean Peninsula after the sinking of the South Korean naval
ship Cheonan in March 2010 and the Yeonpyeong Island attack by North Korea in
November 2010 has led to closer relations between the two countries. Japan partici-
pated in a U.S.-ROK joint military exercise for the ﬁrst time in July 2010 as an observer,
and South Korea also participated for the ﬁrst time in a U.S.-Japan joint exercise in
December 2010.10 In January 2011, the two defense ministers agreed to begin discuss-
ing the possibility of signing pacts to increase cooperation on intelligence sharing and
on providing each other with food, fuel and other materials when conducting joint
activities.11
7 On Cobra Gold 2008, see, Speech Delivered by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Singapore, May 31, 2008.
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid1253 (Last accessed May 7, 2010)
8 JapanAustralia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, March 13, 2007.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html (Last accessed May 7, 2010)
9 In January 2010, Prime Minister Hatoyama expressed his enthusiasm for a Security Declaration between Japan and
South Korea but the ROK government did not reciprocate his enthusiasm and denied that such negotiations were under
way. See for example, Prime Minister to Consider Japan-ROK New Declaration 	
 Asahi
Shimbun, January 8, 2010. http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0108/TKY201001080179.html (Last accessed May
8,2010); Prime Minister Hatoyama Enthusiastic toward Japan-ROK Security Declaration,’ ROK Government Cautious
 
  !"# $%&'() Donga Ilbo, January 9, 2010.
http://japanese.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid2010010962308 (Last accessed May 8, 2010)
10 On Japan’s participation see Beikan Godo Gunjienshu heno Kaijoujieikan no Obzaba Haken nitsuite *On Dispatching
Maritime Self Defense Force personnel as an Observer to the U.S.-ROK Joint Military Exercise+,-./012345
67839:;<=<>?@ABC Press Release by the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, July 23 2010.
http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/info/news/201007/072301.pdf (Last accessed January 20, 2011). On ROK partici-
pation see the Defense Minister’s press conference on December 10, 2010.
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2010/12/10.html (Last accessed January 20, 2011).
11 The two defense ministers agreed to proceed with talks on Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and a
General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). ACSA stipulates reciprocal provision of supplies such
as food, water and fuel between their forces when conducting joint activities. Defense Ministers Toshimi Kitazawa and
Kim Kwan-jin met in Seoul on January 10,2011. “Extra Press Conference by the Defense Minister (6 : 206 : 29 P.M.
January 10, 2011),” Japan Ministry of Defense website. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2011/01/110110.html (last
accessed January 26, 2011)
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2. League of Democracies
The second model is based on a group of democratic states. U.S. Senator John
McCain advocated creating a League of Democracies during his 2008 presidential run.
Although his idea, which would have prohibited the participation of non-democracies, is
on the extreme end of models based on democratic norms, this line of thinking is
popular among those seeking to design a new regional architecture.
One example of this democratic norms model is the East Asia Summit held in
December 2005 when, for the ﬁrst time, Japan invited India, Australia and New Zealand
to participate. This was said to reﬂect the preference of the U.S. government over the
alternative arrangement, ASEAN3, which consisted of ASEAN 10 plus Japan, China
and South Korea.12 The concept of the “arc of freedom and prosperity” proposed by
Taro Aso, then Japanese Minister of Foreign A#airs, is based on a similar logic. In that
case, Aso emphasized the need for Japan to strengthen its ties with the United States,
Australia, India, EU and NATO.13
The logic behind the league of democracies is the democratic peace theory. This
theory is based on the empirical observation that no wars have occurred between
democracies in the past two hundred years. Di#erent variations of democratic peace
theory argue that democratic norms of negotiated settlements, democratic structures, or
a combination of both account for the absence of war among democracies.14 Proponents
of democratic peace theory argue that the more democracies a region has, the more
peaceful it will be.
3. Six-Party Talks Model
The Six-Party Talks, consisting of North Korea, South Korea, the United States,
Russia, China and Japan, has been held to discuss the problem of North Korea’s nuclear
weapons development. Although the six-Party Talks was designed solely to deal with
the North Korean problem, some have proposed using its framework as a basis for a new
regional security architecture.
China has expressed its interest in turning the Six-Party Talks into a permanent
forum and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton frequently expressed her support for
the idea during the U.S. Presidential election of 2008. In the Joint Statement of
February 2007, all six parties agreed to form a working group on the Northeast Asia
Peace and Security Mechanism. Although little progress has been made thus far, the
establishment of the working group suggests that all members have the willingness to
build a security mechanism more permanent than the Six-Party Talks.
12 ASEAN 10 members are Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, Brunei, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar and
Vietnam.
13 Taro Aso, “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons,” Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister
for Foreign A#airs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International A#airs Seminar, November 30, 2006.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html (Last accessed May 13, 2010)
14 On democratic peace theory see, Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review,
Vol. 80, no. 4 (December 1986); John M. Owen IV, Liberal Peace Liberal War: American Politics and International Security
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principle for a Post-Cold War
World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) and Kenneth A. Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain
or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” International Organizations, Vol. 53.
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4. ASEAN-Based Model
ASEAN has been active in building a multilateral regional security framework.
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the only region-wide security mechanism that exists
today. Its members total 26 countries and the EU.15
The objectives of the ARF are to foster constructive dialogue on political and
security issues and to make contributions to conﬁdence-building and preventive diplo-
macy. ARF has set a three-stage process to achieving regional security: Stage 1 focuses
on the promotion of Conﬁdence Building Measures, Stage 2 on the development of
Preventive Diplomacy, and Stage 3 on the Elaboration of Approaches to Conﬂicts.16
Two distinct characteristics of ASEAN-based institutions are their adoption of the
principle of non-interference in internal a#airs of member countries and the consensus
approach to decision making. These rules are collectively termed the“ASEAN Way,”
and they have allowed member states to participate in multilateral institutions without
worrying about limitations being placed on their sovereignty or impacts on domestic
a#airs.17
5. Disaster Relief Model
Currently, there is no regional institution that provides and coordinates disaster
relief despite the fact that the Asia-Paciﬁc remains the world’s most disaster prone
region. Between 2000 and 2008, 40 of the world’s registered disasters occurred in the
region.18 Consequently, governments in the region often express the need for greater
regional cooperation. Because of “the increasing frequency and scale of disasters in the
ASEAN region and their damaging impacts,” in 2005 ASEAN came to an agreement on
Disaster Management and Emergency Responses. Disaster relief is seen to provide an
opportunity for ASEAN countries to cooperate and work towards a common goal.
So far, the United Nations O$ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian A#airs
(OCHA) has been in charge of coordinating the needs of countries a#ected by disasters
and suppliers of relief. OCHA has o$ces in several countries in the region as well as a
regional o$ce in Thailand. But the coordination is mainly conducted by the OCHA
headquarters and bilaterally between a#ected and donor states. Sometimes this has
slowed aid from reaching a#ected areas and has led to arguments in favor of building a
regional framework for disaster relief cooperation.
IV. Assessment of the Models
I will now use Axelrod’s theory to determine which model has the most potential to
provide the basis for security cooperation in the region. To summarize, Axelrod’s
15 ARF members are the ASEAN 10 plus Japan, China, ROK, DPRK, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Russia, Papua New Guinea, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the European Union. ARF
website. http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/AboutUs/tabid/57/Default.aspx (Last accessed May 14, 2010)
16 “ARF Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy,” Adopted at the 8th ARF, 25 July 2001.
http://www.aseansec.org/3571.htm (Last accessed May 14, 2010)
17 On the “ASEAN Way” see, Yuen Foong Khong and Helen E. S. Nesadurai, “Hanging together, institutional design, and
cooperation in Southeast Asia: AFTA and the ARF,” Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston eds., Crafting
Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
18 Regional O$ce for Asia and the Paciﬁc (ROAP), OCHA
http://ochaonline.un.org/OCHAHome/WhereWeWork/ROAP/tabid/5980/language/en-US/Default.aspx (Last ac-
cessed May 20, 2010)
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theory would argue that an optimal security mechanism for the region should: a)
include as members a core of states in cooperative relations; b) have the capability to
monitor behavior and adequately punish violators; and c) create an environment in
which cooperative relations could quickly resume once punishment is completed.
1. A Network of U.S. Alliances
Of the ﬁve models, the U.S. alliance network is the only one with a viable capability
to punish violators. It also has a number of states that share common interests and
norms, and these states could serve as core states that promote cooperation. A recent
increase in the number of countries participating in the network also suggests that
many countries in the region see this model as a potentially acceptable framework.
A weakness in this model is the strained relationship between Japan and the ROK.
The two countries could play leadership roles in building a regional security institution,
but their relationship still has tensions stemming from the period of Japanese coloniza-
tion. For instance, in a poll taken in 2010 a majority of Koreans rated Japan-ROK
relations as bad and did not see Japan as trustworthy.19 As noted in the previous
section, however, the defense forces of Japan and South Korea have become closer and
have indicated their intention to increase defense cooperation.
The biggest problem for this model is whether or not its network can return to
being cooperative after the punishment of a member state. The key feature of coopera-
tion in the Axelrod model is prompt and adequate punishment followed by forgiveness.
The U.S. alliance network, meanwhile, is designed to counter security threats. The
United States and Japan are wary of China’s behavior in the future, but both hope they
are able to establish constructive and cooperative relations with it. The alliance serves
as a hedge should China choose to behave in aggressive ways, and China is aware of this.
The alliance network, therefore, seems to be limited as a basis for security cooperation
in the region unless some things are changed. These possible changes will be discussed
later.
2. League of Democracies
The greatest merit of the democracies model is that it provides a cooperative core,
as the model assumes that conﬂicts of interest will be resolved peacefully through
negotiations among democracies. Di#usion of rules and norms to non-democratic states
is possible and can be expected.
A prerequisite for this model, needless to say, is the existence of democracies.
According to the Freedom House, of the “ASEAN3” countries only Japan, South Korea
and Indonesia are liberal democracies or “free” in terms of political rights and civil
liberties.20 Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are “partly free.” This
number is too small to provide the core of cooperative states necessary under the
Axelrod model. The East Asia Summit members consist of ASEAN3 plus India,
Australia and New Zealand. Counting this way yields 6 democracies out of 16 states. If
19 In a public opinion poll conducted in April 2010, 73 of the South Korean respondents thought Japan-ROK relations
were “bad” and 80 thought that Japan was not trustworthy. The ﬁgures for Japanese respondents were 29 and 45
respectively. “Japan-ROK Relations Good’ Japan 57, ROK 24,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 17, 2010. Yomiuri Online.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/20080116907457/news/20100416-OYT1T01475.htm (Last accessed June 11, 2010)
20 The Freedom House uses the term “free.” Although this is not synonymous with liberal democracy, here I will use the
Freedom House’s indicators.
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we extend the region to include the ARF member states, nine out of 23 countries can be
considered democracies (Table 1).21 The small number of free states in East Asia stands
in clear contrast to the situation in Europe, where all 27 members of the European Union
(EU) are considered free. The EU has made respect for the principles of liberty,
democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law conditions to apply
for membership.22
21 Although EU is a member, I have excluded it. In the case of EU, all of the 27 members are free.
22 European Commission, “Conditions for Enlargement.”
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/indexen.htm (Last accessed June 10, 2010).
These conditions are based on the Articles 6 and 49 of the Treaty on European Union. Article 6 (1) reads: “The Union is
founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law,
principles which are common to the Member States.”
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002M/htm/C2002325EN.000501.html (Last accessed June 10, 2010)
Table 1. Freedom Status of ARF Member Countries
Country Status Political Rights Civil Liberties
Brunei Not Free 6 5
Cambodia Not Free 6 5
Indonesia Free 2 3
Laos Not Free 7 6
Malaysia Partly Free 4 4
Myanmar Not Free 7 7
Philippines Partly Free 4 3
Singapore Partly Free 5 4
Thailand Partly Free 5 4
Vietnam Not Free 7 5
Japan Free 1 2
South Korea Free 2 2
China Not Free 7 6
Australia Free 1 1
New Zealand Free 1 1
India Free 2 2
Russia Not Free 6 5
USA Free 1 1
Canada Free 1 1
PNG Partly Free 4 3
Mongolia Free 2 2
Pakistan Partly Free 4 5
North Korea Not Free 7 7
Source: Freedom in the World 2010, The Freedom House
 1 indicates the highest level of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom
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As stated above, this model depends on the existence of a core of democratic states.
ASEAN6 has the greatest ratio of democracies at six out of 16 (37.5), but this
number is still small. It is not clear whether the six states could serve as the core. It also
will be important for this framework not to exclude undemocratic states in the region
from participating.
Another weakness of this model is the lack of a mechanism for monitoring behavior
and punishing violators. The United States and its allies could provide the means for
punishment as in the U.S. alliance model. However, so far the ARF is the only regional
framework that includes the United States.
3. Six-Party Talks Model
The Six-Party Talks focuses on a single issue. The ﬁve participant countries
Japan, South Korea, the United States, China and Russia all have an interest in
maintaining a nuclear free Korea and preventing North Korea from acquiring deliver-
able nuclear weapons. This common interest spurs cooperation. It may be di$cult,
however, for these countries to ﬁnd another issue besides the North Korean nuclear
problem on which they can cooperate.
The United States, South Korea and Japan potentially could form a cooperative
core, but China and Russia might see them as an opposing force. It is possible that the
ﬁve countries become divided into two camps, thereby creating an obstacle to their
initiating nice behavior. The United States and its allies may provide the punishment
and monitoring that is necessary to spur cooperation, but it may be di$cult for China
and Russia to resume cooperation after receiving punishment.
Maintaining peace in Northeast Asia will continue to be of mutual interest to the
ﬁve countries. The key is for the ﬁve countries to agree on a set of permissible behavior
and to set up a scheme to monitor behavior and punish violators. It will be important
for China and Russia to feel comfortable taking part in this scheme while the United
States possesses far greater military capabilities.
4. ASEAN-Based Model
The principle of non-interference in the internal a#airs of member countries and the
consensus approach to decision making have lowered the entry cost for member
countries. However, these two principles are obstacles to further cooperation based on
Axelrod’s model. Defectors must be punished for the system to function and facilitate
cooperation. The consensus approach to decision making, however, makes carrying out
punishments di$cult because the target country will likely object.
The principle of non-interference may work under Axelrod’s model if participating
countries agree only to punish inter-state aggression. However, this may be di$cult
and become a source of weakness for the ASEAN model. Recently there have been more
trans-national security problems in the region. Some ASEAN members have tried to
modify the non-interference norm in the past,23 but they were met by opposition from
23 Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim raised the concept of “constructive intervention” in July 1997 that
would have allowed ASEAN to give direct assistance to strengthen civil society and legal and administrative reforms
with the consent of the state in question. However, this idea was poorly received by other members. The idea of “ﬂexible
engagement” was also an attempt to allow ASEAN to intervene more e$ciently in problems in the region. Khong and
Nesaduai, “Hanging Together,” pp. 4547.
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other members who feared an “eventual disintegration” of ASEAN.24 The very principle
that contributes to members’ cohesion might hinder further cooperation.
5. The Disaster Relief Model
The strengths of the disaster relief model are its inclusiveness and its apolitical
nature. Disasters are divorced from political values, thereby reducing obstacles for
cooperation.
One stimulus for regional cooperation was the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and
tsunami. About 300,000 people were reported killed or missing in 12 countries. The
most a#ected area was the Aceh Province in Indonesia. Contingents from approxi-
mately 20 countries cooperated in relief and rehabilitation e#orts.25 The United States,
Japan, India and Australia took the lead in providing relief. After the tsunami, various
actors and organizations in the region increased their e#orts in disaster relief coopera-
tion. For example, in June 2006 defense ministers of the Five Power Defense Arrange-
ments (FPDA) agreed on the establishment of a regional center for disaster relief.26 In
February 2009, the ASEAN defense ministers also adopted the concept paper on the use
of ASEAN military assets and capacities in humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief.27
V. Optimal Architecture and Prospects for Success
1. So Which Model?
Each of the ﬁve models has shortcomings when assessed using Axelrod’s model. As
laid out in the section above, no model is structured with the ideal mix of punishment
and cooperation. All either lean too much towards punishment or too much towards
cooperation.
24 Malaysian Foreign Minister, Abdullah Badawi, quoted in Reuters, “ASEAN debate on democracy, human rights shots up,”
26 July, 1998. Also in Khong and Nesaduai, “Hanging Together,” p. 46.
25 Yoshihide Matsuura, “Indian Ocean Tsunami and International Cooperation,” The National Institute for Defense Studies,
ed., East Asian Strategic Review 2006 (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 2006 pp. 4041.
26 Carlyle A. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation (Barton: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010), p.
14.
27 Joint Declaration of ASEAN Defence Ministers On Strengtheining ASEAN Defence Establishments to Meet the Chal-
lenges of Non-Traditional Security Threats, Chonburi, Thailand, February 26, 2009. ASEAN Secretariat website.
http://www.aseansec.org/22314.pdf (last accessed January 10, 2011)
28 The level of the condition met is in the following descending order: /, , /. / (NA) denotes non applicable.
Table 2. Assessment of the Five Regional Models
Core friendly states Capabilities to punish Forgiving
U.S. Alliance Network   
League of Democracies /  
Six Party Talks Model   
ASEAN based Model   
Disaster Relief Model /  / (NA)
 denotes satisfaction of the condition
 denotes absence of the condition
 denotes that the condition is met partially28
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Table 2 rates the degree to which the ﬁve models satisfy the three conditions
stipulated in Axelrod’s model. Of the ﬁve models, the U.S. alliance network model seems
the most promising. This model has a core of cooperative states. It also is the only one
that can provide adequate capabilities to punish, thus satisfying two conditions. As the
mechanism for punishment is important for Axelrod, the U.S. alliance model seems to be
the most promising. The model does not, however, possess the quality of “forgiving,”
which is equally necessary to spur cooperation. This lack of forgiving could cause
skepticism in non-U.S. allies such as China, making them less likely to seek membership.
How to overcome this problem will be addressed in the next section.
The ASEAN based model also satisﬁes two conditions: friendly core and forgive-
ness. It lacks the capabilities to punish. There are two parts to this problem. One is the
lack of actual capabilities to monitor and punish violators. Military capabilities of
ASAEAN countries are still modest and insu$cient to enforce punishment. This may,
however, be overcome by outside assistance. The other is the problem of political
willingness to establish a mechanism of monitoring and punishment. Monitoring,
inevitably intrudes in domestic a#airs of a state if violations are to be detected and
assessed accurately. Punishment would involve intervention by force in some cases.
These go against the preference of ASEAN. So comparing the two models that ﬁt the
Axelrod’s model the most, the question is whether it is easier to make the U.S. alliances
more forgiving or the ASEAN more committed to vengeance.
The Six-Party Talks model has three triangles, indicating that conditions are met
partially. This model may develop into a model that satisﬁes more of Axelrod’s
conditions. Of the six states, the United States, Japan and South Korea could provide a
core of friendly states. This ratio is larger than that of democratic states in the region.
The Six-Party Talks model has the same problem as the U.S. alliance network model in
that China, Russia and North Korea may feel threatened by and skeptical of the U.S.
alliances. Currently the balance is maintained between the two groups: the United
States, Japan and South Korea on the one side and Russia, China and North Korea on the
other. An increase in the friendly core or the model’s capability to punish may disrupt
this balance. Improving all three conditions seems more di$cult than improving the
conditions for the alliance network model or the ASEAN based model. The remaining
two models: the democratic peace model and the disaster relief model do not satisfy any
of the conditions.
2. How to Succeed
In this section, I will examine ways in which the above models could be improved
to better satisfy Axelrod’s conditions and thus provide a basis for regional cooperation.
There are two ways this may be done. One would be to improve each of the
conditions. The two best models, the alliance network model and the ASEAN based
model, will be examined in detail. The other way to improve them would be to combine
some of the models to compensate for the shortcomings in each.
(1) Improvement of the U.S. Alliance Network Model
The U.S. alliance network model must improve its capacity to accommodate a
former aggressor back into the system after negative sanctions have been applied.
Currently, the basic function of the alliances is deterrence, or put another way, punish-
ment against aggressors. Recently, however, the U.S. and Japanese governments have
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emphasized the engagement function of the alliance. For example, in 2005 the two
governments welcomed a constructive role played by China and identiﬁed increasing
cooperation with that nation as one of the alliance’s common strategic objectives.29 The
United States and Japan also have proposed trilateral talks with China, showing that
there is some willingness on the part of the United States and Japan to accommodate
China. China, however, is reluctant to participate in trilateral talks. This may be a
reﬂection of Chinese concerns about the alliance. China also has expressed opposition to
and criticized the U.S.-ROK joint exercise and South Korean participation in the U.S.
Japan military exercise.
The alliance network system must ﬁrst calm the fears of countries such as China so
that they will become willing members. At present, China seems to regard the alliances
as a means to bind and constrain its behavior. This results in China’s skepticism. It will
be important for the United States and its allies to make concessions so that the system
binds their behavior as much China’s. This, however, may cause U.S. allies who are
militarily weaker than China to fear abandonment by the U.S., thereby inadvertently
decreasing forgiveness in the system. The key will be to devise an arrangement where
U.S. allies do not feel insecure and at the same time China is not skeptical of the system’s
intentions. This will be a challenge, however, since in recent years China’s neighbors
have become more wary of China’s rise, while China has become more wary of U.S.
intentions. China’s behavior in 2010, such as its reactions to the ﬁshing boat incident
near the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese) Islands in September and its assertiveness in its
claims to the South China Sea at the ARF meeting in July, have led to Japan and
Southeast Asian countries to move closer to the United States.30
(2) Improving the ASEAN based model
The ASEAN based model lacks the means to monitor behavior and punish violators.
This is caused by the ASEAN way, which is based on consensus and non-interference
principles that are fundamentally at odds with a system based on punishment. This
problem could be solved, however, if non-ASEAN countries provide the means for
monitoring and punishment. The United States and Japan, among others, have been
engaged in capacity building with ASEAN countries, and these e#orts could improve
ASEAN’s monitoring capabilities. The biggest challenge, however, is will. Unless
ASEAN countries embrace the concept of monitoring and punishment it will be di$cult
to improve this model.
One way to proceed would be for member states to agree on a set of rules and
enforce them. They could start from rules that are easy to observe and gradually work
29 The U.S. and Japanese governments agreed that regional common strategic objectives included working to “Develop a
cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as
well as globally.” “Joint Statement U.S.Japan Security Consultative Committee,” Washington, D.C., February 19, 2005.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html (Last accessed January 20, 2011)
30 At the ARF meeting in July 2010 in Hanoi, twelve of the 27 members raised maritime issues in discussion. Chinese
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi was reported to have responded harshly to U.S. Secretary of State Clinton’s statement that
the United States had a national interest in freedom of navigation and respect for international law in the South China
Sea. This invited further concern towards Chinese behavior. China has responded critically to such U.S. and ASEAN
positions. On Chinese response see for example, Luo Yuan “U.S. Gunboat Policy and its Hidden Agenda,” China Daily,
August 18, 2010. Luo Yuan is a Major General and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Society of China Military
Sciences (Academy of Military Sciences) of the Peoples Liberation Army.
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upward. China and ASEAN signed a non-binding code of conduct in the South China
Sea in 2002.31 Since the ARF meeting in July 2010, China has been critical of the U.S.
position on South China Sea issues but has begun discussions with some ASEAN
countries to strengthen their code of conduct and make it legally binding.32 The
challenge here would be for ASEAN countries to impose sanctions on China without
support from the United States, as China has been explicit in its opposition to U.S.
intervention on this issue.
(3) Integrating the Models
As we have seen, each of the models has weaknesses and improving them is not
easy. An alternative would be to combine several models to complement their weak-
nesses. Integrating the two most promising models the alliance network model and
the ASEAN modelmay have the greatest chance of success. If we integrate these two
models we may be able to increase forgiveness and capability. The presence of ASEAN
will dilute some of the confrontational elements in the alliances and make it easier for
non-U.S. allies to join. At the same time, it will provide the capability necessary to
punish violators including China. The rules, once agreed upon, must be enforced in the
case of all parties, including the United States and Japan. This should alleviate concerns
of weaker members and states suspicious of the alliances’ motives.
In the beginning, rules most likely will only include issues that do not involve core
national interests of states. Over time, however, a successful record of cooperative
relations will lead members to agree on more critical issues. In the meantime, the two
di#erent models will exist in parallel. Cooperation on less contentious issues that do not
require punishment, such as in disaster relief, may contribute to reducing skepticism
among countries. Disaster relief mission can be used actively to provide an opportunity
for armed forces to work together.
VI. Conclusion Policy Recommendations
This study shows that none of the models as currently constructed fulﬁlls the
conditions of Axelrod’s model. This should remind policy makers and practitioners of
how di$cult it is to build a successful regional architecture. It should also, however,
remind them not to lose hope even if cooperation does not occur in the short term.
This study also reveals that challenges in many of the models stem from skepticism
of the status quo powers, such as the United States and Japan, and of China. While a
mechanism for punishment is important, cooperation will not occur unless states see an
interest in signing onto the system. The status quo powers that currently hold relative
advantages should restrain themselves to create a better environment for rising powers
to commit themselves to the regional architecture.
The best prospect for regional cooperation seems to be to integrate the two optimal
models: the alliance network model and the ASEAN model. This study recommends
policymakers maintain a multi-layered approach to regional institution building but
31 “Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” November 4, 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (Last accessed February 1, 2011)
32 “China, ASEAN Begin Discussion on Stronger Code of Conduct,” Xinhua, September 30, 2010.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201009/30/content11371512.html (Last accessed February 1, 2011)
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focus their e#orts on combining the two models. The inclusion of China in the regional
architecture is of particular importance, and should be accomplished either by including
China in the talks among U.S. allies or in fora that include ASEAN states.
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